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YANKI: VEYA SÖZCÜKLERİN KÖKENİ ÜZERİNE 
Öz 
 
Bu makale, ses ve dinleme konularını, insanın dünyaya dair deneyiminin fenomenolojisi ve semiyotiği 
bağlamında incelemektedir. Bu tartışma, Jean-Luc Nancy’nin, iletişimi bir dinleme meselesi olarak 
gündeme getirdiğini savunduğum, bir ses felsefesi olan Listening adlı önceki bir çalışmasından hareketle 
oluşturulmuştur. Makalenin ilk kısmı, bu tartışmayı Nancy’den yola çıkarak yürütmektedir. İkinci kısım 
ise söz konusu tartışmayı, Werner Hamacher’in iletişimde ele alındığında varlığın bir yankısı olarak 
yankılandığını veya duyulabildiğini savunduğum sözcüğü, Varlık’ın bir armağanı (Heidegger) olarak, 
incelemesine bağlamaktadır. Makalede dinleme, sözcük ve yankı üzerine geliştirilen perspektifler, insan 
iletişiminin teorik olandan ziyade felsefi bir biçimde, tersine çevrilebilir bir semiyotik ve fenomenolojik 
ilişki olarak nasıl anlaşılabileceğini göstermektedir. 
 
Anahtar Terimler 
İletişim felsefesi, Nancy, dinleme, yankı, dil. 
 
 
Sound and listening. Vast topics, to be sure. But it is their vastness that brings them well 
within the realm of contemporary philosophy of human communication, and not only 
research in biology, physiology, or audiology, the latter of which may reduce the 
immensity of these topics to mundane sense perception which, when examined from the 
viewpoint of Western science and medicine, may not bring us any closer to 
understanding the meanings made of our empirical experiences of touch, sound, and 
sight. The objective of the discussion to follow is to engage Jean-Luc Nancy’s recent book 
Listening, the learning outcome of which, I argue, compels future inquiry into human 
communication as a question of listening. Next, the discussion links sound, listening, and 
communication to Werner Hamacher’s discussion of the origin of the word in Being—its 
echo—or what Nancy calls, resonance. Throughout, emphasis is placed on understanding 
human communication philosophically, not theoretically, as a reversible relation. 
Sound, Listening, Resonance 
Sound is a quantity. It has magnitude and intensity. Listening, however, is a conscious 
experience of sound. Listening moves us, bringing us closer to the source (we want more 
quantity, greater volume) or repelling us from it (if the experience of what is heard is 
disturbing). Listening is a quality that stirs. It excites. But it can also lead to fatigue, then 
perhaps to slumber. Even in the absence of sound, or in the void of the capacity to hear, 
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listening is a primary human engagement with the world. It is, to listening as a 
communicative engagement with the life world that Nancy’s slim volume Listening 
critically attends.1 
For readers unfamiliar with Nancy, his general philosophical program may be 
characterized as post-phenomenological. That is, his concern is less with presence and 
immediacy—the appearance of phenomena as the central concern of more classic schools 
of phenomenology—and more with understanding being in its withdrawal. In that 
respect, Nancy’s philosophy of sound is offered as a critique of visuality and visual 
presence that he contends dominates Western philosophical thought from Kant to 
Heidegger. Two main issues at stake in this philosophy are relevant to human 
communication inquiry. 
First, Nancy argues that “perceived meaning” (how we conceptualize lived 
experience) has visual presence more often than acoustic resonance as its dominant support 
(2007, p. 3). For instance, we say, “I see!” more often than “I feel!” or “I hear!” when 
responding to an experience described by another. Because of its attention to the visible, 
modern philosophical thinking therefore cannot often see what sound gives to it, 
according to Nancy. This is why in Listening Nancy turns our attention away from “what 
presents itself to view—form, idea, painting, representation” and instead shifts it to what 
arises in “accent, tone, timbre, resonance, and sound” (2007, p. 3). He argues that listening 
rather than looking deserves special attention because it is in sound that philosophical 
truths may emerge: 
The sonorous outweighs form. It does not dissolve it, but rather enlarges 
it; it gives it an amplitude, a density, and a vibration or an undulation 
whose outline never does anything but approach. The visual persists until 
it disappears; the sonorous appears and fades away into its permanence 
(Nancy, 2007, p. 2).  
Sound gives form an outline that comes close (it approaches) but does not fully arrive -in 
other words, the shape sonority gives to form is not easily grasped, therefore it is difficult 
to exhaust with concepts, to say nothing of putting into words. Such is sound, and the 
                                                     
1Philosophy of communication raises the experience of sound and listening out from under a transfer model 
of human communication, which underpins how listening is typically defined mechanically in 
communication-discipline specific research as, for example, “the active process of receiving, constructing 
meaning from, and responding to spoken and/or nonverbal messages. It involves the ability to retain 
information, as well as to react empathically and/or appreciatively to spoken and/or nonverbal messages” 
(Walker, 2015, p. 259). 
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attendant challenges in writing effectively about it. That said, however, the difficulty 
presented by sound for philosophical thinking about communication does not diminish 
it. In fact, it increases it because what is left open is its resonance—which also means, its 
contagion. What sound gives for thought to think (resonance) can only be received. It is 
that which must be awaited, truly listened for. 
Having identified sonority as the blind spot of modern philosophy in its visual 
prejudice, Nancy turns his perspective to the listening subject. This is the second point of 
relevance to   philosophical thinking about human communication. Nancy asks: 
 
What is at stake when one truly listens, that is, when one tries to capture 
or surprise the sonority rather than the message? What secret is yielded—
hence also made public—when we listen to a voice, an instrument, or a 
sound for itself? … What does to be listening, to be all ears, as one would 
say “to be in the world,” mean? (2007, p. 5). 
 
Listening as part of philosophy’s curiosity for truth, yes. But more basic than that, 
listening is a basic ontological condition of sense experience of the world. “To listen is … 
literally, to stretch the ear,” Nancy says (2007, p. 5). To stretch or to pull—to tug, or to 
guide and move in this direction or that—actions each of which calls attention to one’s 
orientation in the world. Listening, Nancy tells us, is a question of being. It is fundamental 
to the meaning of human being. 
But this is already banal. The major value of attending to sound and listening 
rather than to vision and visuality (and to do so as an effort to better understand what it 
means to be human), is the extent to which it broadens how we understand 
communication. Nancy’s philosophy of listening contributes to what we know about 
human communication as both a semiotic and phenomenological experience of the 
meanings made of our shared life world. From this perspective (what we can call a “point 
of hearing” rather than a point of view) (Geva, 2012), human communication may be 
understood philosophically, in part, not only as an experience of sight and of sound but 
also of listening. Consider the essential proposal of Nancy’s book: 
 
In all saying (and I mean in all discourse, in the whole chain of meaning) 
there is hearing, and in hearing itself, at the very bottom of it, a listening. 
Which means: perhaps it is necessary that sense not be content to make 
sense (or to be logos), but that it wants also to resound. My whole proposal 
will revolve around such a fundamental resonance (2007, p. 6).  
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Sense wants to resound, Nancy says, not only to be drawn into concepts. Rather than 
rehearse Nancy’s philosophy, what I want to do now is to offer a sense of its perspective—
or better, its accent—by working with its vocabulary as relevant to human 
communication.  
One point of entry is the description Nancy offers of the levels of sensory 
perception. He writes: “Every sensory register … bears with it both its simple nature and 
its tense, attentive, or anxious state” (2007, p. 5). Listening—truly listening—he says, is 
“an intensification and a concern, a curiosity or an anxiety” (2007, p. 5). For my purposes 
of adding to what we know about human communication, listening as “anxiety” is 
important. A basic etymology of the word anxiety (OED) not only includes the senses of 
concern and attending (Dutch, German), but also the senses of fear, sorrow, distress, 
affliction, and even torment (Swedish). Listening as sorrow, distress, and-or anxiety—in 
short, the embodied experience of sound, the sense of its resonance—adds to our 
understanding of human communication as an embodied reversible relation. 
By reversible relation I mean communication as recognition of another person (as 
another person) by way of the same means that one recognizes oneself. As Richard Lanigan 
explains this idea, human communication is “the necessary condition of observing in 
oneself just that sense of self-consciousness that is perceptible in the other” (Lanigan, 2013, 
p.13).2 Although Lanigan uses the figure of observing (ocular-centric) in his definition of 
human communication as reversible, George Herbert Mead draws attention to the 
embodied experience of sound in human communication. He states: “The importance, 
then, of the vocal stimulus lies in this fact that the individual can hear what he says and 
in hearing what he says is tending to respond as the other person responds” (Mead, 1934, p. 
71).3 
The “vocal stimulus” in the above quotation is, for Mead, nothing less than the 
human voice. And we hear them all the time, especially in humanities teaching and 
scholarship whenever one commands, or is commanded, to “find your voice!” whether 
in writing or in speech. This simple command—find your voice—may be understood not 
merely as a call to look but to listen. However, why would one have to find something 
                                                     
2 See also, C. S. Pierce on “communication”: “The recognition by one person of another’s personality takes 
place by means to some extent identical with the means by which he is conscious of his own personality” 
(1892, p. 558) 
3 Emphasis added. 
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that one cannot lose? If there is anything that is truly one’s own, something that makes a 
“me” really me, it is surely one’s voice, is it not? Voice comes from me. It is mine already. 
Yet the injunction “find your voice” makes sense for the reason that voice is an 
imminently alienating phenomenon. My voice not only comes from me, here, and now 
but also it goes from me. “It goes as it comes,” Nancy says (2008, p. 65). Voice—and in 
particular, speaking—is at once a coming and a going. One speaks, and it is gone. 
We experience our voice as alienating when we hear the sound of it played back—
a sound that is never sweet and doesn’t often sooth. It repels. “That’s not me!” we often 
hear ourselves shriek. The disturbance to the sense (or image) of oneself that is caused by 
the experience of hearing one’s disembodied voice, a sound removed from the here and 
now of an act of speaking—which is to say, the experience of listening to oneself speak—
is not limited to voice recording. It also occurs in routine communication settings (again, 
reversible relations), such as when one hears oneself speak intra-personally (for example, 
when reflecting on what to say before coming out with it), and also inter-personally, 
heard, for example, when something we have said returns to us from another person who 
has been persuaded or moved by our words—or worse, when we hear the words of 
another recur to our own speech.  
The experience of voice and of speaking as self-alienating was certainly not lost on 
Jacques Lacan, whose writings significantly inform Nancy’s work. It is Lacan who offers 
one of the most recognizable treatments of human communication as a reversible 
relation: “Human language is like a communication where the sender receives his own 
message back from the receiver in an inverted form” (Lacan, 2004, p. 83). In other words, 
a statement becomes meaningful once a receiver (who hears it, to say nothing of listens for 
it) starts with its end and then works backwards to the context of its utterance. It isn’t 
until a speaker finishes (with emphasis, say: You’re doing WHAT?) that the meaning of 
what is stated (its resonance) can be understood by a listener—understood retroactively, 
in the dissolve of its here and now. Understanding communication as a reversible relation 
(working back from the “here and now” of the utterance to the context of what was said 
in the first place) is especially critical in the context of the psychoanalytic interview for 
the reason that the receiver of verbal statements is always the subject-sender (the patient) 
him- or herself. In analysis, one talks to her oneself speak.  
The Origin of Words 
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What the psychoanalytic example above suggests is that when we are listening—truly 
listening—we are open to what comes to us as well as what goes from us. But that being 
said, what are we listening for? The first part of an answer to this question is that we are 
listening for words, not just their meaning (signifieds, that which is conceived) but also 
their origin—or better, the echo of an origin (the fact that there is language). Here, and as 
a second part of the answer, the “origin” of words must be approached not as a question 
of sign value and history (signifiers) as in Lacanian psychoanalysis; nor should origin be 
conceived here as a question of pure presence, say, in the rupture of silence made by an 
instance of speech, here and now. Rather, origin must be approached in its withdrawal—
that is, in its dissolve, its echo.4 
Echo is not origin, birth, or pure presence. Rather, it is resonance. It is what comes 
back and goes again, giving back what has been given already. In his celebrated essay, 
“What is Metaphysics?” Heidegger invokes the notion of echo and origin in reflecting on 
the presence of the word as a gift of Being. Werner Hamacher summarizes the thematic 
opened by that essay as follows: “It, Being, gives the word and this word is given back to 
it in answer, in the sacrifice of the answer” (Hamacher, 1993, p. 220). This claim deserves 
careful scrutiny in order to grasp the insight it offers into our philosophical vocabulary 
of listening, being, and the reversibility of human communication. Two clauses are 
particularly important.  
First clause: “given back to it.” We can take this to mean that the human Dasein 
speaks (it uses words, it communicates) because it is called. That is, it is called to language 
by the sheer existence of the word, what Hamacher calls a sacrifice (or gift) of Being. I 
will return to the issue of sacrifice in one moment. But to continue, Being gives the word 
(Heidegger says), and human being takes it up—takes it up and gives it back. We can give 
the name language to this “taking up” or appropriation of the word and its putting into 
use in speaking. With regard to the relation between speech and language, Lanigan 
reminds us that “language is both the instrument and the product of speaking.”5 Taking 
up the word (in language) is a response to, or an echo of, the call put to human being by 
the word itself—that is, by the fact of language, the gift of Being. As Heidegger says: “This 
echo is the human answer to the soundless voice of Being” (Heidegger as cited in 
                                                     
4 See Watkin: “For Nancy, it is the statement as such that is true; the truth consists in the enunciation, and 
not in its content or message. … True being no longer hangs on a statement, not on the substance of a 
speaker, nor in an utterance, but in an announcing” (Watkin, 2009, p. 152).  
5. “Language in speaking can be existential by constituting meaning, or language can settle into a sediment 
after being spoken which is an essential meaning” (Lanigan, 1998, p. 161). 
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Hamacher, 1993, p. 220). The gift of Being (its word) is detected (and can be listened for) 
in this answer—in the resonance or echo of communication—heard, as just mentioned, in 
one’s own voice or in the voice of another.6  
Second clause: “in the sacrifice of the answer…” I understand “sacrifice” here not 
merely as a giving up by the giving over of something of Being itself (a gift, a pure 
donation). Sacrifice, instead, is a sharing—a sharing in dialogue. If Being gives up the 
word, then its “taking up” by the human Dasein is a response to the call, or one could say 
the request, put to it by the gift of the word, that which offers a mode of symbolic 
exchange, of communication. To be sure, it is not as if there is a human state of nature prior 
to language.7 Rather, human being is abandoned to language—that is, it is speechless 
without it, is ontologically at language’s mercy and left to its own expressive capacities.8 
Against this background, language can be conceived of as a dialogue (or a meeting) 
between the word of Being and the human answer provided in thought. But what is 
sacrificed? Hamacher offers an interpretation:  
 
The sacrifice of which Heidegger speaks is thus a sacrifice in exchange, not a 
free gift which holds nothing back. It follows the economy of a dialogue 
between the word of Being and the answer of “authentic thought” which 
can be perturbed through no medium and interrupted through no 
mediation (Hamacher, 1993, p. 220). 
 
If language echoes the origin of the word (a sharing of Being voiced in dialogue), 
then communication (the human answer offered in return by way of speech, writing, and-
or gesture) may be understood as thanks—thanks for the sacrifice (the gift giving) of the 
word. Given back … in the sacrifice of the answer. As I hear this, it means: the origin of the 
word (Being’s gift) echoes in its use, that is, its exchange. It echoes as given, received, and 
returned, a continual gift giving.  
                                                     
6 Drawing on studies of sensory stimulation of infants, Rizzuto argues that patients who accept 
psychoanalytic treatment, do so out of hope. She states: “The experience of having been contacted as a self 
by the maternal voice bestows upon the spoken word a sense of hope about the voice and words of the 
mother, and later of other people, the hope that one can be found psychically when one is lost and can be helped 
when in need.” (Rizzuto, 2008, p.735) emphasis added.  
7 “It is a speaking man that we find in the world, and language is its unique condition” (Benveniste, 1973, 
p. 224).  
8 I develop this idea in my book Communication, Embodiment, Community: A Contemporary Continental 
Perspective (forthcoming). See (Agamben, 1991, pp. 31–37). For the concept of abandonment, see (Nancy, 
1993, pp. 43–44). 
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Human communication, characterized from this perspective as giving 
back/answer, is not some act of moral obligation (to pay a debt or to offer a donation in 
kind). Nor is it merely another name for simple “exchange dealings” (Hamacher, 1993, p. 
220). Rather, it is, and shows itself (it occurs) as a fundamental ontological condition of 
human being. Allow me to explain. 
Human being is thrown into existence, says Heidegger, but it does not know why 
(Raffoul, 2012, pp. 74-75). Thrownness is not by choice; human being has no alternative 
but to-be, which is why the meaning of its being arises as a question. Human being is both 
a having-to-be and a having-to-question. Human communication is therefore the mode 
and voice of that questioning: it is a taking up of the word (in language appropriation) 
by and to which human being is abandoned in its very being. Human communicating is, 
in this sense, being in dialogue with and responding to the “soundless” voice of Being, 
the taking place of language.6 As the “origin of word and language,” (Hamacher, 1993, p. 
220), Being echoes or resounds in communication.  
To attend to human communication (that is, to listen, and especially to listen to 
linguistic communication) is, at least in part, to listen for Being—to listen for its echo 
given in the facticity of the word. It is in that respect that human communicating may be 
characterized as an answer, reply, or giving back, a thanks-giving [F. grace] for the gift of 
words which makes human communication possible in the first place—a sacrifice, 
perhaps, of the silence and ownness that, without words (without language), would 
eliminate all exchange dealings. As Hamacher says: 
 
[T]he gift of which Heidegger speaks is given and thus heard as the 
‘soundless voice of Being,’ and in the answer of thought it can only find an 
echo which is just as soundless. What thought hears there and lets resound: ‘that 
Being is’ is nothing other than itself in the strangeness of its own Da-sein 
first made its own in the echo. The word is the echo of its own facticity, and 
it emerges as a word of language only out of this echo (1993, p. 221).7 
 
Heidegger’s insight into “what thought hears” in words as the gift of Being confirms that 
human communication is not merely self-giving (expression) and reception (perception), 
                                                     
6 “Language is then in the first instance nothing else than this taking place and this self-transference of 
language into language and in this sense, what makes it into language, language’s “origin”: the switching 
of language into language” (Hamacher, 1993, p. 221). Cf. (Agamben, 1991, p. 25). 
7 Emphasis added. 
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but is rather, and more profoundly, a giving back of what is already given (a taking up and 
return). If the presence of the word inaugurates the possibility for symbolic exchange, 
and in fact renders the speaking subject as lacking without it, then communication is the 
human answer (a response) to this possibility, this gift of being (of life). It is a taking up 
of the word in response to the calling into language by Being’s sacrifice, its gift of the 
word echoed in all our communications. 
To be sure, communication does not occur carelessly and with abandon, at least 
not in most circumstances. Human communication is the taking place of word and 
language in the pursuit of a meaningful existence, a pursuit accompanied by the fading 
or withdrawal of the word (the “origin” of Being) that can only be listened for in the voice 
that takes it up. Philosophically, listening for the word and the taking place of language 
as they resound in communication calls us back to being. One could even suggest that 
listening reminds us of who we are: namely, beings that have-to-exist together with other 
beings but without fully knowing why. For Nancy, 
 
To be listening will always, then, be to be straining toward or in an 
approach to the self (one should say, in a pathological manner, a fit of self: 
isn’t [sonorous] sense first of all, every time, a crisis of self?) (2007, p. 9).  
 
In short, human being has-to-be; it is called to communicate (it is existentially obliged to do 
so) by the word given, heard, and taken up (appropriated) in language as it works out 
how to be. 
The upshot of this perspective, and the value of it to philosophy of human 
communication, is its deepening of the sense of what it means to engage in 
communication. When we listen, or when attending to what has already been given in 
what is being said (namely, word/Being), we may not only hear one another but also hear 
ourselves. Here is the reversible relation of communication exposed in speaking and 
listening, an echo of co-being. As Hamacher writes: 
 
[A]s answer the sacrifice is an essentially linguistic event, it is the event of 
language, the coming-to-language of language, the event of its making over 
to itself, in which its Being as “soundless voice” holds itself back and 
remains inappropriable. The word is transference and indeed transference 
out of the singularity of its bare that into multiplicity, humanity and a 
making known of what can only then be called “word” and “language” in 
a wider sense (1993, p. 221). 
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Here, Here! Écoute! 
Let me repose the guiding question of the present discussion. What are we listening for 
when we are truly listening? What should in fact be replaced with where. When we truly 
listen, we strain to hear, we are listening for what is not immediate, what is elsewhere, in 
another place, emerging but not yet arriving, as Nancy puts it. The origin of the word, or 
its echo discernible in its sheer “presence,” is neither here or now, but always on the 
move—it is coming and going, going and coming back. “The here has no place: at every 
moment it is here and there, here and now, for here is now,” Nancy says (1993, p. 47). “It 
is at each moment here or there,” Hamacher adds (1993, p. 221). It is for the movement or 
passage of the word that we listen, the taking place of language, of sheer being, its presence 
in withdrawal. 
According to Hamacher, there is in fact nothing more banal in philosophical 
discourse than to speak of the here and now—which, he claims, is Nancy’s career 
preoccupation. Doing so, as a unique singularity—a subject with the capacity for 
expression—inserts one into a community of what came before, Hamacher says, a 
community and a history of discourse about the here and now. To speak here and now of 
the here and now in order to put it into question—that is, to seize on a moment so as to 
break through the generality of the formula “here and now”—is, in fact, to corroborate it, 
to continue. To begin, here and now, says Hamacher, is already to continue, to go on 
repeating what has been said before. The here and now of which one speaks, and from 
which one speaks, now, here, constitutes a movement away from it, from here, to here, or 
here—that is, to another now. To speak of the here and now, or presence, is to distance 
oneself from it, to desist, separate, or move away from it, continuing there and then.  
That being said, another way to articulate that for which we strain when we are 
truly listening when communicating, and why this matters, is that we listen for the 
possibility of communication given in the word by way of its taking up—heard, for 
instance, in quotation, translation, questioning, debate, and-or discussion, whether in 
writing or in speech (even, for instance, in pauses, gaps, silences, and in stuttering—the, 
the, the…). We strain for more than what appears given—listening, that is, for multiplicity, 
for polysemy, to use the vocabulary of communication theory. When we truly listen, we 
attend to the possibility of communication given in the present passing—the now, here, 
which together spells “nowhere”—of the word, its phonemic and graphic function, a 
possibility summoned up (hence, audible) in its use, in discourse, the event of language’s 
taking place (its movement) in every instance of speech/speaking/writing. 
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To be sure, the where of the word is not some pure origin, a transcendent Being. 
Rather, its where is the present passing (the resonance) of language, the placement (or 
“transference,” Hamacher says) of the word in language (signaled each time by the “or” 
carried as background of this word or that, here or there, as Hamacher takes pains to point 
out) (1993, p. 222-225), and its iteration (in citation, translation, in discoursing, and so on). 
Perspective such as this calls our attention to the openness (the existential exposure) 
required for the challenge of listening (as straining) in contrast to the mere physical 
capacity for hearing (the difference of which, Nancy says, is signaled by the 
condescension that resounds whenever someone tells us, “I’m all ears”). Playing on the 
distinction between écoute (F. listen) and entendre (F. hear this), we may take from 
Heidegger/Nancy what Lacan asks of the psychoanalyst: namely, to “have ears in order 
not to hear, so as to detect what is to be understood” (Lacan, 2004, p. 46).  
The obvious upshot of the discussion is that listening in communication is not 
merely perception, a sensory organ function. Rather, it is part of the faculty of 
understanding. But understanding what? To be sure, listening is not equivalent to 
understanding, just as hearing is not equivalent to conceptualization. Listening is an 
activity of attending (of broadening and-or narrowing focus) so as not just to hear but 
also to acknowledge, to be open to that of which we may as yet be unaware. “To be 
listening is always to be on the edge of meaning, or in an edgy meaning of extremity,” 
Nancy says (2007, p. 7). We should therefore replace understanding with thinking and 
offer the following axiom: To listen is to think, to be open. Listening is what we do in the 
open of our shared existence: human being is fundamentally a being-with one another—
being in contact and thereby always in communication.  
The practice of listening exemplifies the experience of communication as a 
reversible relation of self-expression and other-perception: You hear what I am saying, 
here, or now, and so too can I. But are we listening? This basic question (are we listening?) 
deepens awareness of (that is, our ability to reflect upon) our awareness of being-with and 
being-open to others in our mutual condition of having-to-be. Inquiry into listening as an 
embodied, intersubjective experience of sound, grounds it phenomenologically and 
semiotically as a question of communication.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
(13) 
Garnet C. Butchart Moment Journal, 2018, 5(1): 1-14 
References 
Agamben, G. (1991). Language and death: The place of negativity. (K. E. Pinkus with M. 
Hardt, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
Benveniste, E. (1973). Problems in general linguistics. M. E. Meek (Ed.).  Miami, FL: 
University of Miami Press. 
Geva, D. (Director). (2012). Noise [DVD]. Tel Aviv, IL: JMT Films Distribution. 
Hamacher, W. (1993). Ou, séance, touche de Nancy. Paragraph, 16 (2), 216-231. 
Lanigan, R. L. (1998). Phenomenology of communication: Merleau-Ponty’s Thematics in 
Communicology and Semiology. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.  
Lanigan, R. L. (2013, July). Human embodiment: An eidetic and empirical communicology of 
phantom limb. Paper presented at the 6th International Communicology Institute 
Summer Conference, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA. 
Lacan, J. (2004).  Écrits: A selection. (B. Fink, Trans.).  New York, NY: W. W. Norton & 
Company. 
Mead, G. H. (1934).  Mind, self, and society: The definitive edition. C. W. Morris (Ed.). 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Nancy, J.-L. (1993). The birth to presence. Translated by Brian Holmes and others. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press. 
Nancy, J.-L. (2007). Listening. (C. Mandell, Trans.).  New York, NY: Fordham University 
Press. 
Nancy, J.-L. (2008). Corpus. (R. A. Rand, Trans.). New York, NY: Fordham University 
Press. 
Peirce, C. S. (1892). The law of mind. The Monist 2 (July), 533-559.  
Raffoul, F. (2012).  Abandonment.  In B. C. Hutchens (Ed.). Jean-Luc Nancy: Justice, Legality, 
and World (65–81). New York, NY: Continuum.   
Rizzuto, A. M. (2008).  The Talking Cure and the Analyst’s Intentions. Psychoanalytic 
Review 95 (5), 729-749. 
Walker, R. (2015). Strategic management communication for leaders. (3rd ed.).  Stamford, CT: 
Cengage Learning.  
  
 
(14) 
Garnet C. Butchart Moment Journal, 2018, 5(1): 1-14 
Watkin, C. (2009). Phenomenology or deconstruction? The question of ontology in Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricoeur and Jean-Luc Nancy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press.  
 
